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Abstract:
We analyze the role of the new goods margin in the Baltic countries’ exports and imports
growth during the 1995–2008 period. Using the methodology developed in Kehoe and Ruhl
(2013), we define the set of least-traded goods as those that account for the lowest 10% of
total exports and imports in 1995, and then trace its growth in several markets including the
Baltics’ main trade partners, the European Union and Russia. We find that, on average, by
2008 least-traded goods accounted for nearly 50% of total Baltic exports to their main trade
partners. Moreover, we find that increases in the share of least-traded exports coincided with
the timing of the trade liberalization reforms implemented by the Baltic countries. Least-
traded imports also grew at robust rates, but their growth was lower than that of exports,
accounting for slightly less than a quarter of total imports, that is, about half of the exports
value. Moreover, we find that the shares of least-traded imports from the EU 15 and from
Russia started diverging around the time the Baltic countries joined the EU, with the EU
15 share increasing and the Russian one declining. We also find that the Baltics’ share of
least-traded exports outpaced that of other economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Fi-
nally, exports of new goods from the Baltic countries suffered noticeably during the Global
Financial Crisis. After the crisis ended, the restart in new goods exports growth displayed
mixed patterns.
JEL classification: F13, F14.
Keywords: economic integration, international trade, extensive margin, new goods margin,
Global Financial Crisis.
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1. Introduction
The enlargements of the European Union (EU) that granted membership to ten former
members of the Eastern Bloc in 2004 and 2007 were watershed events in which the transition
economies of Eastern and Central Europe became integrated with Western Europe.1 Since
free trade was one of the key components of EU accession, joining the EU provided new
opportunities for trade growth among new and old members.
This increase in trade could occur because countries export and import more of the goods
that they had already been trading. But the liberalization of trade could also promote trade
in goods that had previously not been traded. In the literature, the former is usually referred
to as trade in the intensive margin, while the latter is usually called trade in the extensive
margin, or the new goods margin.2
What drives the increases of trade in previously non-traded goods? Kehoe and Ruhl
(2013) find that growth in the new goods margin of trade is brought about by trade liberal-
ization reforms (such as NAFTA or China’s accession to the WTO) and by episodes of deep
structural change (such as the one that Korea and Chile underwent during the 1970s and
1980s). Moreover, they also find that increases in the new goods margin are not driven by
other factors such as the product cycle or the business cycle. Ruhl (2008) proposes a theory
to account for these findings. Following Melitz (2003), Ruhl’s model features firms that face
entry costs of exporting. Trade liberalization reforms are modeled as permanent changes
that raise the profit from exporting and induce firms that were initially non-exporters to
begin exporting, thus leading to increases in the new goods margin. This hypothesis is sup-
ported by the study of Bernard et al. (2003), who find that US manufacturing firms choose to
enter the export market as trade costs fall. Other papers report similar outcomes: Arkolakis
(2010), for example, uses market penetration costs to understand the positive correlation
between trade liberalization and the number of small exporters in each exporting market.
A number of studies have recently highlighted the importance of the new goods margin
during episodes of trade liberalization. This is due to the fact that increases in the extensive
margin of both imports and exports have significant implications in terms of welfare and
productivity. For example, Broda and Weinstein (2006) quantify the welfare gains resulting
from the growth in product variety from US imports for the 1972–2001 period, and estimate
the value to American consumers of the expanded import varieties to be 2.6% of GDP. Thus,
1Cyprus and Malta also joined the EU in 2004.
2To be precise, the “extensive margin” and the “new goods margin” measure similar, but not exactly
identical margins of trade. The extensive margin includes both new goods that become traded and previously-
traded goods that stop being traded, whereas the new goods margin only includes new goods that become
traded. We explain these differences in more detail in Section 3.
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increases in the imports extensive margin have significant welfare consequences. On the ex-
port side, in his very influential article, Melitz (2003) shows that reductions in trade barriers
increase the profits that firms can earn abroad, and encourages both existing exporters to
increase their exports (the intensive margin) and also new firms to begin exporting (the
extensive margin). This in turn leads to output and employment being allocated towards
exporters, which are highly productive firms, thus raising the average industry productivity.
Therefore, if export growth following the liberalization of trade is mainly due to the exten-
sive margin, then increases in productivity can be attributed, at least in part, to increases
in trade in new goods.
In this article, we study the patterns of the extensive margin of trade for the case of the
three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. After gaining independence from the
Soviet Union in 1991, these countries implemented a series of extensive market liberalization
policies, including aggressive trade liberalization reforms. As they opened their economies
to the world, the Baltics experienced rapid trade growth. We ask whether this period of
rapid trade expansion also coincided with increases in newly-traded goods by quantifying
the relative importance of the new goods margin between 1995 and 2008.
Our choice of the three Baltic countries is motivated by the following facts. First, the
Baltic countries went through exactly the kind of economic transformations that Kehoe and
Ruhl (2013) identify as the main drivers of extensive margin increases. Second, unlike other
Eastern and Central European economies, the Baltics used to be part of the Soviet Union
and therefore lacked of any degree of autonomy. Upon independence, they faced a vast array
of challenges, most notably among them the difficult task of establishing trade relation-
ships with the rest of the world, which prior to 1991 were determined solely from Moscow.
Third, as mentioned previously, from the onset of the transition, the three countries became
leading reformers among the formerly centrally-planned economies and quickly underwent
market reform transformations with success. Indeed, the term “Baltic Tigers” was coined to
highlight the rapid economic growth experienced by the Baltic countries, in contrast to the
economic and political crises that have plagued other regions, such as the countries of the
former Yugoslavia. Lastly, as former Soviet republics, the Baltic nations had sizable portions
of ethnic Russian-speaking population, most of which remained in the Baltics even after their
independence. Thus, in principle, this gives the Baltic countries a unique potential to better
tap into the Russian market.
In our empirical analysis, we assess the role of the Baltic new goods margin with a number
of trade partners. In particular, we choose the EU (taken as the single bloc made up of the
15 countries prior to its expansion in 2004), as well as some of its individual members such
as Germany, Sweden and Finland, since they are among the most important Baltic trade
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partners. We also study the new goods margin with Russia, given the historical ties between
the Baltic states and Russia. Besides our benchmark analysis, we extend our investigation to
test whether the increase in the new goods margin with the EU and Russia was unique to the
Baltic countries, or instead it was a generalized fact across the transition economies. Finally,
we also extend our period of study up to 2014 to determine whether the large collapse in
international trade during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2009 had any impact on the
new goods margin in the exports of the region.
Our study employs the methodology recently developed by Kehoe and Ruhl (2013)
(henceforth KR), who rank goods from smallest to largest by their trade values in the
base year and accumulate the ordered goods to form ten sets or bins, each containing 10%
of total trade. The goods in the first set are labeled as “least-traded goods,” since they
represent the goods with the lowest trade values.3 We believe KR’s approach of defining
least-traded goods by using a threshold that takes into account the relative—rather than
absolute—importance of a good in total trade is the appropriate one to adopt in an inves-
tigation like the one we conduct. Other studies, most notably among them Evenett and
Venables (2002), use a fixed amount to classify a good as being not traded (for example,
$50,000). But using arbitrary absolute thresholds is problematic given the large variation
in total trade values among countries. In particular, for small economies or economies with
small aggregate trade volumes, such a threshold can imply a completely different relative
importance of a good labeled as not-traded and would result in very few goods being traded.
Since Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are among the smallest countries in Europe, this issue
is of particular importance and leads us to choose KR’s methodology over other potential
techniques.4
The contribution of our paper is to provide answers to a set of specific questions: How
do trade liberalization reforms affect export and import trends? Do these reforms deepen
existing trade relationships or do they encourage new trade opportunities? Our analysis is
also informative to policymakers who can devise strategies that are conducive to promoting
new exports to new markets. Furthermore, our paper allows us to document the interesting
case of previously-closed economies that quickly opened to trade, and understand whether
such economies tend to specialize in trading a relatively small set of products, or instead
they expand the variety of goods that they purchase from and sell to the rest of the world.
Our main findings are as follows: first, we find strong increases in the share of previously
3Note that the set of least-traded group contains both goods with zero trade value and with positive, but
small, values.
4Even within the Baltic countries there is a wide variation in trade volumes, with Lithuania’s merchandise
trade being, on average, 40% larger than Estonia’s and almost 100% larger than Latvia’s.
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non-traded or least-traded goods between 1995 and 2008, a period that for the Baltic coun-
tries entailed transformational changes such as accession into the EU. The set of goods that
in 1995 constituted the bottom 10% of Baltic exports to their main trade partners jumped to
nearly 50% in 2008. Moreover, the share of least-traded exports exhibited increases that co-
incide with the timing of the major trade liberalization reforms implemented by the Baltics.
Second, least-traded imports into the Baltics also displayed significant growth, but on aver-
age the magnitudes were at most half the values of their exports counterparts. Additionally,
we find that the shares of least-traded imports from the EU 15 and from Russia started di-
verging around the time the Baltic countries joined the EU, with the EU 15 share increasing
and the Russian one declining.
Third, we find that the Baltic share of least-traded exports outpaced that of other
economies in Central and Eastern Europe such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
For example, least-traded exports to the EU 15 and Germany accounted for approximately
40% and 53% of average Baltic exports in 2008, respectively. The corresponding shares for
the non-Baltic countries were significantly lower: 22% for the EU 15 and 21% for Germany.
In addition, we find that the majority of the non-Baltic countries’ exports were driven by
the intensive margin, whereas the extensive margin played a more important role for the
Baltic countries.
Finally, we look at the behavior of the new goods margin during the Global Financial
Crisis. Due to the unprecedented and widespread nature of this economic downturn, exports
of new goods from the Baltic countries also suffered significantly between 2008 and 2011.
After the crisis ended, the restart in new goods export growth displayed mixed patterns, with
least-traded exports to the EU resuming growth and new goods exports to Russia declining.
The methodology in Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) has been previously employed to analyze
the role of the extensive margin in other trade liberalization episodes. For example, Sandrey
and Van Seventer (2004) measure the growth of new goods exports from New Zealand to
Australia after the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement between the two countries
was enacted in the mid 1980s, and find that, on average, the relative importance of the
new goods doubled for the 1988–2003 period. Amarsanaa and Kurokawa (2012) focus on
the period of structural reforms in Mongolia and find evidence of large increases in the
extensive margin of trade with its major trade partners, including instances when the least-
traded goods ended up accounting for 100% of the total Mongolian exports to a subset of
countries. Dalton (2014) documents China’s exports and imports of least-traded goods to
and from Japan following its accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the
early 2000s, and also finds increases in the extensive margin, although they are of smaller
magnitudes than the ones we find for the case of the Baltic countries. Similarly, Dalton
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(2016) focuses on the behavior of Austrian new goods exports and imports to and from the
new EU entrants. Finally, Hloušek (2010) analyzes the changes in the extensive margin for
the Visegrad5 countries’ exports to the EU 15 bloc and finds increases in least-traded goods
for all four countries, although they are of smaller magnitudes than the ones we document
for the Baltics. Hloušek’s work, however, restricts its attention to the 1993–2006 or 1997–
2006 periods, thus potentially missing the delayed effect on trade flows generated by the
2004 EU expansion. Although all these studies share a common methodology and relatively
comparable qualitative results, our work stands apart because all previous papers deal with
countries that were, in one way or another, previously engaged in international trade, while
the Baltic countries did not have trade relationships with the rest of the world prior to their
independence from the Soviet Union.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the
trade liberalization reforms implemented in the Baltics since their independence. Section
3 describes the methodology we employ in our analysis, the data we work with, and the
selection of trade partners. Section 4 describes the main results for least-traded exports and
imports. In Section 5 we extend our analysis by conducting a cross-regional comparison and
by including the Global Financial Crisis period. Section 6 discusses the main results of our
analysis and Section 7 concludes.
2. Trade Liberalization in the Baltics6
After regaining their independence in 1991, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decisively
embraced trade liberalization. Although the speed and extent of the trade reforms were
uneven across the Baltic states, they were implemented in a more aggressive manner than
the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, even though their transition to market
economies started earlier. The trade liberalization reforms encompassed several dimensions:
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral.
At the individual level, Estonia was the country that implemented the most aggressive
trade liberalization reforms among the three Baltic states, including a unilateral removal of
import tariffs. By 1993, the average weighted Estonian tariff rate was below 2% and by
1997 it was reduced to zero, including agricultural goods. The trade liberalization reforms in
Latvia and Lithuania were also substantial, but not as far-reaching as in the case of Estonia.
5The Visegrad countries is a group of four Central European states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia.
6This section is based on the findings in Feldmann (2001), Feldmann and Sally (2002), Vilpǐsauskas
(1998), Vilpǐsauskas (2003) and Pautola-Mol (2003).
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On the bilateral level, in September 1993 the three countries signed the Baltic Area Free
Trade Area (BAFTA), which came into effect in April 1994 and by July 1998 had removed
all non-tariff barriers to trade, thus creating a virtually frictionless trade area. The Baltic
countries also independently negotiated free trade agreements with the European Free Trade
Association, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey
and Ukraine. These agreements were of particular importance to secure market access for
Estonia, given that it had unilaterally removed import tariffs.
On the multilateral track, the Baltic countries sought to liberalize their foreign trade
by applying for accession to the World Trade Organization. Latvia started negotiations in
1993 and Estonia in 1994; they both became WTO members in 1999. Lithuania applied
for accession in 1994 and gained membership in 2001. The Estonian case was quite unique
because, in anticipation to EU accession, it wished to bind tariffs in the WTO at levels above
the rates it applied at the time of negotiations (which were basically zero).
However, among all the external liberalization efforts the Baltic states pursued, accession
into the EU was the most coveted objective, not only because of its economic implications,
but its geopolitical ones as well. Membership into the EU first started with the bilateral
free trade agreements Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed with the EU in July 1994, and
entered into force in January 1995. The free trade agreements mandated the gradual removal
of trade restrictions and envisioned an eventual free trade area. These free trade agreements
were replaced by the Association Agreements each country signed in June 1995 and entered
into effect in February 1998. These Association Agreements included additional economic
cooperation and increased political dialogue between the two parties.
The signing of the Association Agreements encouraged the Baltic countries’ demands for
accession into the EU. In 1996, the European Commission recommended to start accession
negotiations with Estonia, but not with Latvia or Lithuania. Latvia and Lithuania would
not start their own negotiations until February 2000. It was ultimately decided that all
three countries would join the EU at the same time, during the 2004 expansion that granted
membership to the Baltic countries and seven other nations in Central and Eastern Europe
and the Mediterranean. By becoming EU members, the Baltic countries were required to
abandon their individual external trade policies and replace them with the EU’s Commer-
cial Common Policy. Consequently, the Baltics completely liberalized trade with the other
members of the EU, but at the same time increased the level of tariffs they would have to
apply to industrial and agricultural goods originating from outside the EU, given the Baltics’
less protectionist stance prior to EU accession (especially in the case of Estonia, which had
unilaterally eliminated its import duties).
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3. Methodology
3.1. Data
We use detailed bilateral merchandise trade data extracted from the World Bank’s World
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, reported on annual frequency. We focus on the
1995–2008 period, a span that includes the years when the trade liberalization and structural
reforms where implemented, as documented in Section 2. The choice of 1995 as the initial
year in our sample is due to two factors: first, the WITS trade data is not available for all
the three countries prior to 1995. Second, as Bems and Jönsson Hartelius (2006) point out,
1995 is the first year in which the Baltic countries can be appropriately considered as open
economies. Similarly, we limit our analysis up to 2008, to isolate our results from the effects
of the Global Financial Crisis.7 The data we use is disaggregated at the 5-digit level of the
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 2 code. This implies that our
analysis includes a total of 1836 goods.
3.2. Defining Least-traded Goods
To construct a measure of the new goods margin in international trade, we employ the
methodology developed by Kehoe and Ruhl (2013), who define the set of least-traded goods
as the group of commodities that were initially traded in low volumes or not traded at all.
More precisely, for each good Kehoe and Ruhl first compute the average trade value (either
exports or imports) during the first three years in the sample (in our case, we average the
values for 1995 to 1997). Next, goods are sorted in ascending order according to the three-
year average. Finally, the cumulative value of the ranked goods is grouped into 10 bins, each
containing 10% of total trade. The basket of goods in the bottom decile (or the bottom 10%
of total bilateral trade value) is labeled as the “least-traded” goods, or the “new” goods.
By construction, the least-traded goods set includes all the goods that recorded zero trade
volume, as well as some goods that recorded positive but low volume of trade.8 With goods
grouped in 10% sets, we can trace the growth of trade value for each bracket between 1995
and 2008, paying particular attention to the bottom decile, which represents the growth of
trade of the least-traded goods, or the “new goods margin.”
7In the sensitivity analysis section, we extend our period of analysis to 2014, to understand the impact
of the trade contraction caused by the GFC on the Baltic new goods margin.
8Note that the resulting cutoff value that defines the least-traded goods in the KR methodology is specific
to the country pair and the trade flow direction, and differs from thresholds with fixed-dollar amounts used
by others in the literature. For example, Feenstra (1994) and Hummels and Klenow (2005) use $0 as the
threshold for traded/non-traded goods, whereas Evenett and Venables (2002) use $50,000. In the Appendix,
we find that our qualitative findings remain unchanged when we use an alternative fixed-value cutoff.
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3.3. Decomposition of Trade Growth: Extensive and Intensive Margins
The “new goods” methodology allows us to trace the changes in the relative importance
of the goods in the bottom decile, but does not provide information on the contributions
of the extensive and intensive margins to overall trade growth, since it only focuses on the
shares of each bracket in total exports or imports and not on the changes in trade volumes.
More specifically, the least-traded goods methodology only considers new products being
exported or imported at the margin. On the other hand, the concept of the extensive
margin should include not only new entrants contributing to the new goods margin, but
also some previously-traded goods that exit the market over time. Thus, to complement our
analysis, we also decompose the growth of trade into extensive and intensive margins, to
further understand their relative importance in total trade growth.9 To do so, we follow the
methodology used by Kehoe and Ruhl (2013), which in turn is adapted from Hummels and
Klenow (2005).
We summarize trade decomposition methodology briefly. Consider the growth in trade
for a specific country-pair between time t and s for s ≥ t. We use i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} to denote
a good in G, the set of all goods in both periods. Moreover, xi,t represents the trade value
(exports or imports) of good i in year t, and x̄t is defined as the cutoff value for goods to
be included in the set of the least-traded goods, that is, x̄t is the trade value of the last
good to be included in the bottom decile in period t. Consequently, a good i is labeled as
“least-traded” if xi,t ≤ x̄t. Let GT(t), a subset of G, denote the basket of the goods in year
t that are not in the basket of least-traded goods in year t (that is, all goods such that
xi,t > x̄t). Similarly, GT(s) is the set of goods in year s that recorded trade volumes in excess
of x̄t, or xi,s > x̄t. Thus, GT = GT(t) ∩ GT(s) contains the goods that are traded in excess of
x̄t in both years. With this notation, the growth of trade between years t and s is:
1 + γ =
∑
i∈G xi,s∑
i∈G xi,t
(1)
where γ is the growth rate of trade. We define the growth rate of the intensive margin of
trade as the growth of trade in the goods that belong to GT (or the trade growth in goods
that were traded more than x̄t, in both years):
1 + γIM =
∑
i∈GT xi,s∑
i∈GT xi,t
(2)
9In what follows, due the different focuses of the two measures, we will use the term new goods margin to
refer to changes in exports or imports shares accounted for by the least-traded goods (as defined in Section
3.2), while we will employ term extensive margin in the context of the trade growth decomposition analyses.
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Taking the ratio of (1) and (2), the extensive margin of trade growth is defined as the residual
of total trade growth not accounted for by the intensive margin:
1 + γEM =
[∑
i∈G xi,s∑
i∈G xi,t
]
/
[∑
i∈GT xi,s∑
i∈GT xi,t
]
=
1 + γ
1 + γIM
(3)
Finally, taking logarithms on both sides of (3) and expressing the growth rate of total trade
as relative shares of the intensive and extensive margins:10
log(1 + γ) = log(1 + γIM) + log(1 + γEM)
1 =
log(1 + γIM)
log(1 + γ)
+
log(1 + γEM)
log(1 + γ)
(4)
(intensive margin share) (extensive margin share)
3.4. Trade Partners
Table 1 shows the share of exports and imports of the main trade partners for each Baltic
country. We use this information to guide our choice of trade partners in our analysis.
Table 1. Baltic Countries’ Trade Partners
(percent of total merchandise exports and imports, 1995–2008 averages)
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Average
Partner Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
EU 15 54.3 46.0 52.5 51.5 43.7 43.7 50.1 47.1
Germany 6.5 9.6 12.8 16.4 13.4 16.3 10.9 14.1
Sweden 13.3 6.7 9.3 6.8 4.0 3.4 8.9 5.6
Finland 20.7 14.8 2.5 7.7 1.3 3.0 8.2 8.5
United Kingdom 3.5 2.5 12.5 2.5 5.2 2.9 7.1 2.6
Netherlands 2.6 2.1 2.9 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.0
Other Baltics 12.6 4.0 16.7 14.8 11.4 5.5 13.6 8.1
Russia 11.8 9.0 10.8 10.4 15.0 24.2 12.5 14.5
United States 2.0 2.8 2.8 1.7 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.3
First, we choose the 15-country bloc that constituted the European Union prior to the
2004 expansion, due to its importance in total trade for the Baltic countries.11 In what
follows, we refer to this group as the “EU 15.”
10Note that these shares are not restricted to take values between 0 and 1.
11The 15 members are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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In addition to the EU 15, we also look at subset of its member countries. Germany stands
out because it is by far the largest trade partner within the EU for Latvia and Lithuania.
Similarly, Finland and Sweden are the two largest trade partners for Estonia. We combine
those last two countries into a single group, which we refer to as the “Nordics.”
Finally, we choose Russia because of its historical ties to the Baltic countries and because
it is one of their largest trade partners. Indeed, between 1995 and 2008 Russia accounted
for large shares of merchandise imports and exports to and from Estonia and Latvia, and
was the largest merchandise trade partner of Lithuania. In addition, trade relations with
Russia evolved unevenly across the individual Baltic countries. Prior to the 2004 EU Baltic
accession, Estonia and Latvia did not receive Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment from
Russia, while Lithuania did. However, once the Baltic countries joined the EU, the bilateral
trade relationships were replaced by the common trade policy between the EU and Russia.
Since the EU and Russia had an existing agreement to remove trade barriers under the Com-
mon Economic Space agreement, joining the EU provided for better access to the Russian
market for Estonia and Latvia, facing lower tariffs.
4. Benchmark Results
For ease of the exposition, the results below refer to the average Baltic exports and
imports of least-traded goods, rather than the trade flows of each individual Baltic economy.
In the Appendix, we present detailed least-traded goods data for each individual Baltic
country.
4.1. The Evolution of Least-traded Exports: 1995–2008
Finding 1: The Baltic countries recorded strong growth in least-traded exports, which by 2008
accounted for nearly half of all exports to their main trade partners.
In Figure 1 we document the distribution of average Baltic exports to the EU 15, Ger-
many, the Nordics, and Russia for the 1995-2008 period. The horizontal axis depicts the
cumulative fraction of 1995 exports value split in 10% brackets, while the vertical axis dis-
plays the corresponding fraction in 2008. The height of each column indicates how much
the basket of goods in each bin accounts for the trade value in 2008. For instance, the set of
the least-traded exports to the EU 15 in 1995 (which comprised the lowest 10% of average
Baltic exports to the EU 15) makes up 39.8% of the total exports to the EU 15 in 2008.
To facilitate comparisons, we include a horizontal line at the 10% value in the vertical axis.
Thus, if a column exceeds the horizontal line, this means that the trade of the goods con-
tained in that set was higher than the average trade growth. Hypothetically, if all bars were
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aligned exactly at the horizontal line, it would mean that trade growth across all brackets
was uniform, with no changes in relative shares.
For all the export destinations we consider, we find significant increases in the least-
traded goods share of total exports. As previously mentioned, for the case of the EU 15, the
fraction of least-traded exports jumped from 10% in 1995 to nearly 40% in 2008. Looking
at the individual main EU trade partners, growth in least-traded exports was even larger,
accounting for nearly 53% and 49% of total exports to Germany and the Nordic countries,
respectively.
Figure 1. Composition of Baltic Exports
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Since the trade liberalization policies implemented by the Baltic countries had an intra-
regional and EU-oriented focus, a pertinent question is whether the new goods margin growth
happened mostly with EU partners at the expense of other major non-EU countries, namely,
Russia. Despite their Western-oriented trade policies, we find that least-traded exports to
Russia grew at comparable rates. Indeed, when averaged across the three Baltic economies,
the share of least-traded exports to Russia grew from 10% in 1995 to 49% in 2008.
Finding 2: The share of least-traded Baltic exports to their main trade partners exhibits increases
that coincide with the timing of the major trade liberalization reforms they implemented.
Figure 1 displays the distribution of exports in two points in time (1995 and 2008), but
does not capture the movements of least-traded exports over time. It could well be the
case that 2008 was an anomalous year and does not reflect a generalized trend. Thus, we
document the evolution of least-traded exports during our period of analysis. In particular,
we are interested in finding whether the exports of the least-traded goods were affected by
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the various trade liberalization events experienced by the Baltic countries, and whether the
pace of least-traded export growth differs across the destinations of their exports. These
trends are depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Least-traded Goods Exports (1995–2008)
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We find that the share of least-traded exports to the EU 15 and its member countries grew
at a relatively consistent pace throughout the whole sample period. A deeper look reveals
that least-traded exports to the EU 15 grew at the fastest rate between 2002 and 2005, when
its share grew from 19% to 29%. For the main trade partners within the EU, least-traded
exports toward Germany and the Nordic countries display noticeable “jumps” around the
late 1990s and mid 2000s. Thus, the faster growth in least-traded exports destined to the
EU coincided with the periods when the Association Agreements and accession into the EU
entered into effect.
During this same period, least-traded exports to Russia, which initially had been growing
at a similar rate as the least-traded exports to the top EU trade partners, stagnate in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. This suggests that as the Baltic countries received preferential
treatment from the EU, they were able to increase their export variety mix in that market
at the expense of the Russian market. New goods exports to Russia only resume growth
after the Baltics’ accession in the EU. The timing in this increase points out the indirect
benefit of joining the EU, which automatically provided preferential treatment for Estonian
and Latvian exports into the Russian market, such as MFN status.
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4.2. The Evolution of Least-traded Imports: 1995–2008
Finding 3: Least-traded imports into the Baltic countries also display significant growth, but
their magnitudes are at most half the values of their exports counterparts.
The Baltic countries also recorded rapid growth in their imports of least-traded goods.
However, the role of least-traded imports is of a much smaller scale when compared to the
case of exports, especially with their main trade partners. In particular, least-traded imports
from the EU 15, Germany and the Nordic countries grew at a pace that was roughly half
the one observed for Baltic exports of least-traded goods to those same markets.
Figure 3 depicts least-traded imports from the EU 15. While in 1995 they accounted
for 10% of total EU 15 imports by the Baltic countries, by 2008 they had increased to an
average of 22%, about half of its exports counterpart. Similarly, new goods imports from
Germany and the Nordics experienced a marked increase between 1995 and 2008, going from
10% to around 27% and 23%, respectively. However, this growth is again about half the one
recorded by Baltic exports of least-traded goods to those same countries.
Figure 3. Composition of Baltic Imports
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Least-traded imports from Russia also registered lower growth than exports, accounting
for 16% of total Russian imports in 2008. This is roughly one third of the increase recorded
by least-traded exports to Russia. In fact, the distribution of imports from Russia shows that
sizable growth took place in the goods that had been previously traded (mainly petroleum),
as shown in the growth of the top two decile brackets.
Turning to the time series, as depicted in Figure 4, the share of least-traded imports
from the EU 15 showed a persistent but smooth increase from 1995 to 2008, without re-
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markable surges in any particular year. Moreover, when focusing on the individual EU
members, we find that the shares of least-traded imports from Germany and the Nordics
show steep increases between 1997 and 2000, a period which includes the years of the Asso-
ciation Agreements coming into effect. After stabilizing for a couple of years, these shares
started increasing again after 2004, the year of Baltic accession into the EU.
Figure 4. Least-traded Goods Imports (1995–2008)
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Finding 4: As the Baltic countries joined the EU, least-traded imports from and exports to Russia
show divergent patterns, with least-traded exports resuming growth and least-traded imports
declining.
As we documented in Section 4.1, least-traded exports to Russia, which had stagnated for
a number of years, restarted growing around the time the Baltics joined the EU and gained
preferential treatment from Russia as EU members. On the other hand, the evolution of
least-traded imports from Russia showed an opposite pattern. Least-traded imports were
on the rise until 2002, but that trend reverted starting from 2003, with least-traded imports
from Russia experiencing a continuous decline ever since. This change in imports patterns
can be attributed to the trade diversion effect generated by the Baltic countries joining the
EU customs union in 2004: prior to their accession into the EU, the Baltics’ tariffs were in
general low. Upon EU accession, the Baltics had to adopt the EU’s Commercial Common
Policy, which eliminated trade restrictions among EU members but, from the perspective
of the Baltic countries, increased tariffs on non-EU imports, thus discouraging Russian new
goods imports.
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4.3. Decomposition of Trade Growth and the Role of the Extensive Margin
In this section we examine the role of the extensive margin in exports and imports growth,
using the decomposition methodology outlined in Section 3.3.
Finding 5: The share of the extensive margin of Baltic exports is similar between the EU (and
its member countries) and Russia. While the extensive margin plays a smaller role in imports
than in exports, we find that the share of the extensive margin is larger for EU imports than for
Russian imports.
Table 2 presents the growth rate of total Baltic exports (in nominal terms) between 1995
and 2008, as well as the share of the extensive margin. We find that the growth rates of
Baltic exports to the EU 15 and Russia between 1995 and 2008 were quite high and similar
in magnitude. In addition, there are no large variations in the share of the extensive margin
when we compare the two markets. As for the case of the individual EU members, the share
of the extensive margin was as high as 23% for the German market and 22% for the Nordic
countries.12
Table 2. Exports Growth and the Share of the Extensive Margin
(percent)
Total Export Growth Share of Extensive Margin
EU 15 488.2 12.2
Germany 313.9 23.4
Nordics 612.5 21.7
Russia 486.2 12.3
Switching to imports growth, we present our results in Table 3. For all the main trade
partners except for the Nordic countries, the growth rates of imports exceeded those of
exports. On the other hand, the fraction of imports growth that can be attributed by the
extensive margin was consistently lower than the corresponding figures for exports, rarely
surpassing the two-digit mark, which was the norm for the case of exports. For the EU 15,
Germany and the Nordic countries, only around 2–4% of the total trade growth was due
to the extensive margin, a value significantly lower than the contribution of the extensive
margin from the export side. For imports from Russia, the share of the extensive margin is
in fact negative at -18%, implying that Russian imports were dominated by existing imports
rather than by new goods.
12The growth in total exports of each individual Baltic country was quite similar, in particular for exports
to the EU 15. In spite of these similarities in overall growth, the role of the extensive margin shows a different
story: export growth due to the extensive margin in Estonia lagged its counterparts in Latvia and Lithuania
for most destinations, except for Russia. More details are provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 3. Imports Growth and the Share of the Extensive Margin
(percent)
Total Import Growth Share of Extensive Margin
EU 15 595.8 3.9
Germany 663.6 3.6
Nordic 387.2 2.0
Russia 504.4 -17.5
5. Additional Analyses
5.1. Cross-Regional Comparison
Our previous results documented significant increases in Baltic exports of new goods, and
that a sizable fraction of Baltic total export growth can be attributed to newly-traded goods.
We also found that this pattern holds for both EU countries as well as for non-EU countries
such as Russia. In this section, we ask whether the export growth along the new goods
margin is a unique feature of the Baltic countries, or instead a generalized trend throughout
the transition economies. More specifically, we compare the patterns of least-traded goods
trade observed in the Baltics with those in other major transition economies in Central
Europe: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.13
Finding 6: The new goods margin in exports played a much larger role for the Baltic countries
than for other transition economies, with a larger variety of goods exported to its main trade
partners. Moreover, exports of new goods from the Baltics to the EU continued growing at a
robust rate after joining the EU, while it came to a halt after EU accession for the non-Baltic
economies in our sample.
In Table 4 we show the average Baltic and non-Baltic share of least-traded exports in
2008. An immediate result is that the share of least-traded exports is consistently higher
for the Baltic countries than for the non-Baltic countries, for all the export destinations we
consider. Looking at total world exports and exports to the EU 15, the Baltics’ share of
least-traded goods in 2008 increased to approximately 30% and 40%, respectively. On the
other hand, over the same period, the non-Baltic average increase in the fraction of least-
traded goods was roughly half of the observed values in the Baltic countries. For the main
13For those non-Baltic countries, Hloušek (2010) reports the patterns of new goods exports to the EU
15. However, his study differs from ours in that he focuses on a different time period (1993–2006 or 1997–
2006, depending on data availability for each particular country) and analyzes a smaller set of goods (760
products, or around 40% of the number of products in our study) because he uses a less-finely disaggregated
decomposition of trade (4-digit level of the SITC classification, instead of the 5-digit disaggregation level we
conduct).
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trade partners within the EU, we also find that the increases in the share of least-traded
exports were consistently larger in the Baltic countries than in the non-Baltic economies.
One potential explanation for the lower growth in the least-traded exports in the non-Baltic
countries during the 1995–2008 period could be due to the fact that these countries had
already enjoyed free access to the EU market dating back from 1992.14 Finally, for exports
to Russia, the average share of least-traded exports is also higher for the Baltics than for
the non-Baltics.
Table 4. Share of the Least-Traded Exports in 2008
(percent)
Baltics Non-Baltics
World 29.5 14.8
EU 15 39.8 21.8
Germany 53.1 20.5
Nordics 48.9 40.7
Russia 48.6 36.1
Next, we take a deeper look at the data and trace the evolution of the share of least-
traded exports over time. We show the results in Table 5 below. We find that, prior to 2004,
both the Baltic countries and the non-Baltic transition economies recorded high growth
rates of the share of the least-traded exports to the EU 15. This trend changed after 2004:
while there is no marked slowdown in the Baltic growth rate, the non-Baltic growth in least-
traded exports all but stops upon EU accession. Additionally, while growth in exports of
least-traded goods to Germany and Russia decelerates for both Baltics and non-Baltics the
growth rate in the Baltic countries is significantly higher than what we observed for the non-
Baltic countries. The only exception where growth rate patterns are reversed is for exports
to the Nordic countries.
Table 5. Growth of the Share of Least-Traded Exports Over Time
(percent, annual average)
14The Europe Agreements between the EU and the non-Baltic countries came into force in February
1994. However, the market-access and trade-related portions of the Agreements entered into effect in March
1992. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this earlier trade agreement between the non-Baltic
countries and the EU.
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(1995–2004) (2004–2008)
Baltics Non-Baltics Baltics Non-Baltics
World 8.3 3.9 9.2 0.6
EU 15 10.6 9.2 12.9 0.4
Germany 16.7 6.9 7.5 3.9
Nordics 14.1 11.4 11.6 16.4
Russia 14.2 12.9 10.6 4.9
Finally, in Table 6 we present the overall growth in exports and the contribution due to the
extensive margin. We notice that the overall magnitudes of export growth for the Baltics and
the non-Baltic countries are similar, though larger for the non-Baltics. On the other hand,
the share of the extensive margin in export growth reveals a contrasting picture: they are
consistently higher for the Baltic countries than for the non-Baltic countries. On average, the
contribution of the extensive margin in Baltic exports to the EU 15 and Germany is 12% and
23% respectively, whereas the corresponding fractions for the non-Baltics are significantly
lower, at around 3 to 4%.
Table 6. Export Growth and the Share of the Extensive Margin (1995–2008)
(percent)
Total Export Growth Extensive Margin Share
Baltics Non-Baltics Baltics Non-Baltics
World 698.3 676.0 7.0 0.4
EU 15 488.2 574.6 12.2 3.7
Germany 313.9 475.3 23.4 3.2
Nordics 612.5 805.8 21.7 8.0
Russia 486.2 508.0 12.3 -1.8
5.2. The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the Extensive Margin
Finding 7: New goods exports experienced a significant growth slowdown during the GFC across
the board. Additionally, the restart in new goods export growth displayed mixed patterns.
In the benchmark analyses, we restricted our attention to the period between 1995 to
2008, since our interest was on the patterns of new goods margin growth during the various
episodes of Baltic trade liberalization reforms, including accession into the EU. By stopping
at 2008, we wanted to avoid any sort of distortion created by the GFC.
However, a valid issue to consider is how exports of newly-traded goods behave during
severe economic downturns.15 We document the behavior of the new goods margin during a
15Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) claim that regular business cycle events are not drivers of growth in the new
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period of unprecedented collapse in international trade in the aftermath of the GFC. To do
so, we extend the period of analysis from 1995 to 2014. Indeed, the Baltic countries’ trade
experienced a significant negative swing during the GFC. During the 2009-2010 period, total
nominal exports fell by 23% in Estonia and Latvia and by 31% in Lithuania. However,
the decline in exports was short-lived, since from 2010 onward all three countries recorded
increases in nominal exports.
In Table 7, we analyze the share of the least-traded exports during the extended sam-
ple period, and decompose the changes in the share of the least-traded goods for three
sub-periods: 2005 to 2008 (before the GFC), 2008 to 2011 (a span characterized by trade
collapse), and 2011 to 2014 (when trade recovers). We find that in comparison to the period
prior to the GFC, growth in the share of least-traded exports shows a noticeable slowdown.
For example, the share of the least-traded exports to the EU increased by 1.1 percentage
points between 2008 and 2011, which is one tenth of the magnitude observed during the
period 2005 and 2008. For all other export destinations, we observe similar patterns of de-
celeration in the growth of the least-traded export shares. However, for the period between
2011 and 2014, EU-bound exports of the least-traded goods rebounded, as their share in-
creased by 3.6 percentage points. For the individual EU members and Russia, the patterns
are mixed. On the one hand, exports to the Nordics followed a similar trend to the EU as a
whole, with the share of the least-traded exports resuming growth. On the other hand, the
share of least-traded exports to Germany and Russia showed no change or even a decrease
during the post-GFC period.
Table 7. Changes in the Share of Least-Traded Exports (2005–2014)
(percentage points)
(2005-2008) (2008-2011) (2011-2014)
World 4.6 3.8 2.3
EU 15 10.7 1.1 3.6
Germany 9.1 3.7 0.0
Nordics 11.5 3.1 6.0
Russia 8.7 6.2 -0.4
goods margin by comparing trade among NAFTA countries with United States exports to Germany, Japan
and the UK (or non-NAFTA countries) between 1989 and 1999. Since no significant trade liberalization
or structural reform took place between the United States and the non-NAFTA countries, regular business
cycles would not impact the extensive margin in trade.
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6. Discussion of Results
Our results indicate that the Baltic countries increased both their imports and exports
of least-traded goods substantially. What are the implications of such trends beyond simply
the expansion of trade? As we noted in the Introduction, increases in the import variety
mix entail non-negligible welfare effects. Besides the results found by Broda and Weinstein
(2006) for the United States, Chen and Ma (2012) also quantify that, for the case of China,
the welfare gains resulting from increases in import variety between 1997 and 2008 are
equivalent to 4.9% of GDP, while Chen and Jacks (2012) find that the increase in import
varieties between 1988 and 2007 is associated with Canadian consumers’ welfare gains as
large as 28%. Thus, increases in the imports extensive margin have also significant welfare
implications and ignoring them would lead to systematically understate the gains from trade.
We expect that the Baltic consumers also experienced large welfare gains due to the increases
in the imports of previously least-traded goods observed in those countries.
Additionally, our findings also document that the Balitcs’ increases in their exports of
least-traded goods were even larger than their imports counterparts. Moreover, the Baltics’
increases in the exports new goods largely exceeded the increases recorded by other transi-
tion economies. In a recent article, Feenstra and Kee (2008) employ a variant of Melitz’s
monopolistic competition model to show that, for a sample of 44 countries, the total increase
in export variety is associated with an average 3.3% productivity gain per year for exporters
over the 1980-2000 period, and that export variety can explain a substantial fraction of
the within-country variation in productivity. Although the link between productivity gains
and least-traded exports is beyond the scope of this study, we conduct simple back-of-the-
envelope calculations to explore whether the larger variety of export products is associated
with higher productivity gains for the case of the Baltic countries. To measure productivity
growth during the 1995-2008 period, we construct labor productivity series using data from
the World Input-Output Database (WIOD).16 In Table 8, we present the share of least-traded
exports to the world and the growth rate of labor productivity for the Baltic countries and
for the transition countries we considered in Section 5. We find that, on average, the Baltic
increases in labor productivity were approximately twice as large as the observed values for
the non-Baltic counterparts. Moreover, Estonia, which among the Baltic countries recorded
the largest increase in least-traded exports, also experienced the largest increase in labor
productivity. On the other hand, Lithuania, which was the Baltic country that recorded the
smallest increases in least-traded exports also displayed the smallest gains in labor produc-
16Our definition of productivity differs from that in Feenstra and Kee (2008) since we look at the evolution
of labor productivity, whereas they focus on total factor productivity.
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tivity.17 While a more precise study is needed, this preliminary analysis seems to suggest
that increases in least-traded exports are accompanied by increases in labor productivity,
thus underscoring the importance of the new goods margin.
Table 8. Least-traded Exports and Labor Productivity
(percent)
Share of least-traded Growth rate of
Country exports in 2008 labor productivity
Baltic average 29.5 105.3
Estonia 35.9 117.2
Latvia 34.0 104.0
Lithuania 18.8 94.8
Non-Baltic average 14.8 59.3
Czech Republic 9.5 51.2
Hungary 12.2 53.0
Poland 22.6 73.7
7. Conclusion
In this article, we analyze the behavior of the extensive margin of trade for the three
Baltic countries between 1995 and 2008, a period that coincides with episodes of market
transition and accession into the European Union. More specifically, we assess by how much
the overall growth in Baltic exports and imports was due to goods that had previously not
been traded.
There is a considerable debate about the relative roles of the extensive and intensive
margins in trade growth: Hummels and Klenow (2005) concludes that the extensive margin
is the primary driver of export growth while Helpman et al. (2008) and Besedeš and Prusa
(2011) found that the intensive margin plays the dominant role.18 Our paper contributes to
the literature by disentangling the roles of the extensive and intensive margins in economies
that were previously closed to trade and quickly opened their foreign sectors. Our contribu-
tion is not only limited to documenting the driving forces of the new goods margin, but also
addresses important policy implications by identifying new trading opportunities.
We find that the new goods margin played a crucial role in the growth of Baltic trade.
Indeed, by 2008, nearly half of total exports bound to and almost a quarter of total imports
17Note that the same positive relationship between share of least-traded exports and labor productivity
holds for the non-Baltic countries.
18It is worthwhile, however, to note that these terminologies do not necessarily have the same meaning
across papers. In some cases, the extensive margin refers to the number of exporters for a given good (for
example, as in Chaney, 2008), while in other cases it refers to the country-pair specific export relationship
(as in Rose, 2004). In our paper, by extensive margin we refer to the trade growth of goods that had not
been traded before or been traded in low volumes.
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coming from the Baltic countries’ main trade partners could be accounted for by the goods
that previously had been not traded or traded in very low volumes. This robust growth in
new goods trade is quite a unique characteristic of the Baltic economies: when we compare
our results for the Baltic countries with a sample of transition countries in Central Europe
with a similar magnitude of overall export growth, we find markedly smaller increases in
the new goods margin for the non-Baltic economies. In addition, while the Baltic economies
recorded similar growth rates along the extensive margin until 2008, the Global Financial
Crisis led to a sizable decline in the new goods margin across the region.
The Baltic countries, and in particular Estonia, are usually portrayed as exemplary mod-
els of trade liberalization. As we have documented in this paper, they outpaced their re-
gional peers in growing the imports and exports of the goods that initially were traded in
low volumes. An interesting study that could be motivated from our article could feature a
model that quantitatively assesses the role of trade liberalization reforms in expanding the
new goods margin, applied to compare the different experiences of the transition economies.
Similarly, most of the reforms that opened the Baltic economies were implemented when the
countries were not yet members of the EU. By accessing the Union, the Baltics adopted its
Commercial Common Policy and relinquished their abilities to independently liberalize their
economies even further. Thus, another interesting research project could focus on tracing the
response of the extensive margin for the Baltic and other Central and the Eastern European
countries to the new free trade agreements the EU has recently finalized or is currently in
the process of negotiating.
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Appendix 1: Least-Traded Goods Patterns for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
Figure A.1. Composition of Estonian Exports and Imports
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Figure A.2. Composition of Latvian Exports and Imports
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Figure A.3. Composition of Lithuanian Exports and Imports
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Table A.1. Fraction of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Least-traded Exports to Main Trade Partners
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Year EU 15 Germany Nordics Russia EU 15 Germany Nordics Russia EU 15 Germany Nordics Russia
1995 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
1996 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08
1997 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.09
1998 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.13
1999 0.12 0.20 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.26
2000 0.11 0.39 0.07 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.37 0.20
2001 0.12 0.28 0.09 0.31 0.20 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.40 0.18
2002 0.14 0.43 0.14 0.26 0.22 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.39 0.14
2003 0.15 0.37 0.16 0.26 0.24 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.44 0.19
2004 0.19 0.45 0.19 0.32 0.30 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.25 0.38 0.43 0.25
2005 0.25 0.46 0.22 0.43 0.32 0.41 0.43 0.48 0.31 0.45 0.47 0.29
2006 0.25 0.47 0.23 0.49 0.35 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.34 0.45 0.49 0.34
2007 0.30 0.50 0.32 0.55 0.35 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.40 0.52 0.52 0.39
2008 0.33 0.53 0.34 0.49 0.45 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.41 0.52 0.58 0.42
Table A.2. Fraction of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Least-traded Imports from Main Trade Partners
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Year EU 15 Germany Nordics Russia EU 15 Germany Nordics Russia EU 15 Germany Nordics Russia
1995 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
1996 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07
1997 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06
1998 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.08
1999 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.23 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.08
2000 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.27 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.07
2001 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.34 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.08
2002 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.38 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.08
2003 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.28 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.30 0.09
2004 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.09
2005 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.06
2006 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.07
2007 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.11
2008 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.05
Table A.3. Export Growth and the Share of the Extensive Margin (1995–2008)
(percent)
Total Export Growth Share of Extensive Margin
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Estonia Latvia Lithuania
EU 15 468.0 457.3 539.3 7.5 14.4 14.8
Germany 330.3 283.9 327.6 21.5 14.3 34.4
Nordics 486.1 448.4 902.9 4.7 38.7 21.7
Russia 563.5 186.5 708.5 17.0 10.0 9.9
Table A.4. Import Growth and the Share of the Extensive Margin (1995–2008)
(percent)
Total Import Growth Share of Extensive Margin
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Estonia Latvia Lithuania
EU 15 360.5 660.9 766.0 5.0 2.0 4.8
Germany 745.3 642.5 603.1 3.6 1.9 5.5
Nordics 169.0 371.3 621.4 2.6 1.8 1.7
Russia 252.8 430.1 830.2 -29.3 -9.6 -13.7
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Appendix 2: Using an Alternative Threshold to Define Least-Traded Goods
In our analysis, we followed the KR methodology and defined least-traded goods to be
specific for each country pair. In this section, we examine whether the qualitative findings
we previously uncovered change when we use an alternative cutoff to define least-traded
goods. Specifically we label a good as least-traded if the average trade volume in the first
three years of the sample is less than $50,000. This is the same approach used in Evenett
and Venables (2002).
The results for the share of least-traded exports and imports in 2008 are shown in Table
A.5. As we use a fixed-value threshold, the share of least-traded goods in 1995 is smaller
for larger trade partners (such as EU 15) as there are many fewer goods that are traded
in volumes smaller than $50,000. Despite the differences in the initial shares, we find that
least-traded exports and imports also show significant growth, as shown by their shares in
2008. In addition, the magnitude of the growth on the import side is also at most half the
magnitude of the export counterpart, which coincides with our previous findings. Thus, we
confirm that Findings 1 and 3 still hold under the alternative methodology. We also note
that the ranking of increases in the shares between 1995 and 2008 using the alternative cutoff
remains the same as the one when we use the KR methodology. That is, the largest gain
in the share of least-traded goods (in both exports and imports) takes place with Germany,
followed by the Nordics, Russia, and EU 15.
Table A.5. Shares of Least-Traded Goods Using a $50,000 Cutoff
(percent)
Exports Imports
1995 2008 1995 2008
EU 15 1.0 16.4 0.5 7.1
Germany 2.9 36.8 2.5 15.2
Nordics 2.3 31.5 2.6 12.3
Russia 2.4 25.4 3.1 9.0
Next, we analyze the evolution over time of the share of least-traded goods under the
alternative threshold. Those trends are depicted in Figure A.4. Similar to our findings
in Section 5, we confirm that the share of least-traded Baltic exports to their main trade
partners exhibits increases that coincide with the major trade liberalization reforms. We
also confirm that least-traded exports to Russia stagnates around the late 1990s and early
2000s, followed by a rebound period that coincides with the Baltic accession into the EU.
For the case of imports, we find that while the share of least-traded imports from the EU
members shows sustained growth throughout the 1995-2008 period, the share of least-traded
imports from Russia experiences a steep decline starting from 2003. These findings concur
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with Findings 2 and 4 in Section 5.
Figure A.4. Least-traded Goods Trade (1995–2008) Using a $50,000 Cutoff
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Vilpǐsauskas, Ramūnas, 2003. Regional integration in Europe: analyzing intra-Baltic eco-
nomic cooperation in the context of European integration. In The Road to the European
Union, Volume 2: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, edited by Vello Pettai and Jan Zielonka.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 163-204.
29
